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NOTES AND COMMENTS
International Extradition Law and the
Political Offense Exception: The
Traditional Incidence Test as a
Workable Reality
I. INTRODUCTION
In the sensationalization of recent episodes in international extra-
dition law,' some courts claim that the present application of the
political offense exception in extradition proceedings has allowed the
United States to become a haven for international terrorists.2 Defend-
ants have asserted the political offense exception as a defense to extra-
dition from the United States for terrorists acts.
3
One episode includes the roundly criticized case of Karadzole v.
Artukovic.4 In Artukovic, the Yugoslavian government sought the ex-
tradition from the United States of a former Minister of the Interior
of the puppet Croatian government which took over a portion of Yu-
goslavia following the German invasion in April, 1941. After the
war, Artukovic fled to the United States. Artukovic was charged with
the war crime of directing the murder of hundreds of thousands of
civilians in concentration camps between April, 1941 and October,
1942. The District Court for the Southern District of California held
that Artukovic's offenses were non-extraditable political offenses. 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's hold-
1. Such episodes include the Achille Lauro hijacking and Nazi war criminal Artukovic;
see infra text accompanying notes 4-6, 8-12.
2. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (The United Kingdom sought
Doherty's extradition from the United States for his murder conviction in Northern Ireland.
The district court held that Doherty was exempt from extradition under the political offense
exception); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981) (Israel sought Eain's extradition from
the United States as he was charged with exploding a bomb in an Israeli marketplace. The
United States granted Eain's extradition).
3. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern
Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 317 (1983).
4. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
5. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Karadzole
v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacatedpercuriam, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), remanded
sub nom. United States ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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ing, rejecting the argument that war crimes are so barbaric and atro-
cious they cannot be considered political crimes. 6 The United States
Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded
the case for an extradition hearing. The Supreme Court did not com-
ment on any of the substantive issues.7 Because the Artukovic Court
failed to establish a clear line of demarcation between political vio-
lence that furthers a political uprising and violence that is merely con-
temporaneous with such an uprising, critics assert that the exception
promotes a haven for terrorists.8
A second episode involved the hijacking of an Italian cruise ship,
the Achille Lauro.9 On October 7, 1985, four members of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked the ship as it was near-
ing Port Said, Egypt.' 0 Among the four hundred people aboard the
ship, fourteen were United States citizens." The hijackers indicated
that the United States citizens aboard would be the first to die if their
demands were not met. 12 Consequently, one United States citizen on
the Achille Lauro, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered.1 3 The United
States unsuccessfully sought to use its bilateral extradition treaties
with Italy' 4 and Yugoslavia'5 to obtain the provisional arrest of the
hijacker's commander, Mohammed Abbas.16 Similar to the United
States, both Italy and Yugoslavia maintain a political offense excep-
tion as a defense to extradition that international terrorists seek to be
exempt from extradition proceedings.
This Comment will first examine the historical development of
the political offense exception in the United States courts. Second,
this Comment argues that there is no need to create a new mechanism
for defining political offenses in order to ensure that international ter-
6. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 202-04 (9th Cir. 1957).
7. See Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
8. Thompson, supra note 3, at 324.
9. Comment, The Achille Lauro Incident And The Permissible Use Of Force, 9 Loy.
INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 481 (1987).
10. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
11. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
12. As their principal demand, the hijackers sought the release of fifty Palestinians from
Israeli prisons. N.Y. Times, supra note 9, at Al, col. 6.
13. Id.
14. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Mar. 23, 1868, United States-Italy, 15
Stat. 629.
15. Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 25, 1901, United States-Yugoslavia, 32 Stat. 1890.
16. Sofaer, The Political Offense Exception And Terrorism, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & P. 125
(1986).
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rorists will be subject to extradition. i7 Finally, this Comment pro-
poses that a proper application of the traditional incidence test,' 8
aside from any improper misapplications or deviations, rightly serves
the objectives of the political offense exception. The traditional inci-
dence test does not cover acts of international terrorism. 19 Quinn v.
Robinson, a recent case exemplifying a correct application of the inci-
dence test will be explored. 20  It will become apparent that any
problems within the political offense exception arise upon deviation
from or misapplication of the traditional test. Therefore, this Com-
ment concludes that the problem with the political offense exception
does not lie in the application of the present incidence test but with
deviation from the current United States law.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION LAW AND THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION
A. Historical Origins of Extradition Law
Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or con-
victed of crimes against the law of a state who are located in a foreign
state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment.
21
The historical origin of the first recorded extradition treaty dates back
to 1280 B.C.22 This peace treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and the
Hittite Prince Hattusili III provided for the return of one party's
criminals who were found in the territory of the other party.
23
Originally, international extradition developed with the need to
preserve the internal order of the respective states. 24 Extradition was
a gesture of friendship and cooperation between sovereigns. 25 Be-
tween the sixteenth and eighteenth century, however, sovereigns used
17. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806 (9th Cir. 1986). (The Quinn case supports the
assertion of the author).
18. For a glaring deviation from the traditional incidence test, and an example of its
improper application, see Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
19. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805. (Again, the Quinn case argues that the traditional incidence
test is a proper application of the political offense exception as does the author).
20. Id. at 776.
21. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIG. OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1968).
22. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3
(1974).
23. Langdon and Gardiner, The Treaty of Alliance Between Hittusili King of the Hittite
and the Pharaoh Ramses I1 of Egypt, 6 J. EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179 (1920).
24. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 5.
25. Id. at 1.
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extradition for economic reasons in order to maintain channels of Eu-
ropean commerce rather than for altruistic motives. 26 Since the eight-
eenth century, the main purpose of extradition has been to serve an
international means of cooperation to suppress common criminality.
Extradition is no longer motivated by economic aspirations. 27
In international law, the duty to extradite another country's
criminals has generally not been looked upon as an absolute duty.
28
Therefore, most countries enter into bilateral treaties in order to en-
sure the return of their own alleged criminals. Both the United States
and England do not permit extradition in the absence of a treaty obli-
gation. 29 Pursuant to a bilateral treaty, one participating government,
such as the United Kingdom, will formally request that its own crimi-
nal be extradited from the other participating country, such as the
United States. 30 Today, the United States is party to ninety-six bilat-
eral extradition treaties with other nations.
31
Traditionally, the substantive requirements of extradition have
been threefold:32 (1) the offense that the requesting state is claiming
must be an extraditable act;33 (2) the offense must adhere to the rule
of double criminality;34 and (3) the requesting state must comply with
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. For example, in 1953, the Supreme Court of Venezuela surrendered an American
national to Panama in the absence of an extradition treaty with that country. The Venezuelan
Court held the surrender was "in conformity with the [p]ublic [liaw of [n]ations [whereby]
friendly [s]tates recognize a reciprocal obligation to surrender offenders who have taken refuge
in their respective countries." In re Tribble, 20 I.L.R. 366, 367 (1953); M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 22, at 9; see H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (5th ed. 1916).
29. M. BASIOUNI, supra note 22, at 25.
30. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States - United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468. The extradition procedure generally involves the following steps. The for-
eign government communicates its request for the accused's return to the United States
through diplomatic channels. Id. art. VII. The United States government then applies to a
federal magistrate for a provisional arrest warrant on behalf of the foreign government. The
magistrate may grant this request if an extradition treaty is in effect, if the offenses charged are
within its provisions, and if the accused is within the magistrate's jurisdiction. Id.; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1982). The foreign government then must request extradition formally within forty-
five days of the accused's arrest, which request must include the accused's name and national-
ity, the facts of the offense(s), the text of the law involved, and a warrant of arrest issued by the
proper authority of the foreign government. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-
United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468, art. VII.
31. For a list of the ninety-six nations which are parties to the bilateral extradition trea-
ties with the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1986).
32. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 312-13.
33. Id. at 315.
34. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1971).
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the principle of speciality. 35
Regarding the first requirement of international extradition law,
there are two different methods to determine whether the offense is an
extraditable act. The generally adopted method is the "enumerated
method" 36 where the treaty "speciflies] by name the offenses for
which extradition will be granted. ' 37 The alternative development in
treaty practice has been the "eliminative method. ' 38 Here, "extradit-
able offenses are defined by reference to their punishability according
to the laws of the requesting and requested states by a minimum stan-
dard of severity."
'39
Assuming that the magistrate40 determines that the offense is ex-
traditable, the second substantive requirement for extradition is
double criminality. This rule requires that an act shall not be extra-
ditable unless it constitutes a crime according to the laws of both the
requesting and the requested states.41 The rule of double criminality
is illustrated by Re Gerber,4 2 a decision of the German Federal
Supreme Court in 1957. Switzerland requested the extradition from
Germany of a defendant charged with an offense which according to
German law was burglary. However, under Swiss law, the same al-
leged crime constituted three separate offenses: larceny, damage to
property and breaking the peace of a private home. Both burglary
and larceny were treaty offenses, but the other two offenses were not.
The Gerber court held that the set of facts underlying the offense
charged were decisive. Thus, Germany had a duty to extradite de-
spite the fact that the legal qualifications of the offense differed in Ger-
man and Swiss law.43
35. Id. at 146.
36. The enumerative method has a limitative effect as it confines the application of the
treaty only to those offenses named. The main flaw of this method is that the list might omit
certain offenses and later it might prove to be too bothersome to include them by supplemental
treaty. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 315, 317.
37. I. SHEARER, supra note 34, at 133.
38. The eliminative method is indicative rather than limitative, as it defines extraditable
offenses by their punishment. It is a more convenient method because it avoids unnecessary
detail in the treaty and avoids mistake of omitting crimes. The main flaw in this method is that
it is impractical to implement with systems that have a notable disparity in penalties. M.
BAsSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 316, 317.
39. Id. at 134.
40. A magistrate is a public official exercising administrative and often judicial functions.
WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1358 (1968).
41. I. SHEARER, supra note 34, at 137.
42. Judgement of April 11, 1957, Bundesgerichtschof, GrSSt, W. Ger., 10 Bundesgericht-
shof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 221, 24 Int'l L. R. 493 (1957).
43. Id. at 495.
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Finally, the principle of speciality further restrains potential ex-
tradition. Under the doctrine of speciality, a requesting state cannot
try the accused for any offense other than the one for which surrender
was made.44 If a magistrate in the requested state suspects the re-
questing state's intentions are corrupt, 45 extradition will be denied.
The rationale for the doctrine of speciality is to shelter the relator
from unexpected prosecution even though the doctrine is mostly em-
ployed to shelter the requested state from misusing its processes.4 6
However, the rule of speciality is restrictive; it only applies to
instances that prevent the requesting state from breaking its interna-
tional duties with regard to the requested state.47 Therefore, it is es-
sential to determine whether the surrendering state would regard the
prosecution at issue as a breach of its relations with the receiving
state. As expounded in United States v. Rauscher,48 "the rule of speci-
ality does not apply when extradition has been granted by an act of
comity by the surrendering state."'49 However, such a restrictive view
of the rule of speciality must be applied in the context for which it was
designed. The doctrine of speciality restricts the requesting states to
only prosecute the extraditee for those offenses for which the accused
44. I. SHEARER, supra note 34, at 146.
45. The European Convention On Extradition at Paris aptly explains the rules governing
speciality regarding illegitimate motives:
ARTICLE 14. RULES OF SPECIALITY
1. A person who has been extradited shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or
detained with a view to the carrying out of a sentence or detention order for any
offence committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he was extradited,
nor shall he be for any other reason restricted in his personal freedom, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the Party which surrendered him consents. A request for consent
shall be submitted, accompanied by the documents mentioned in Article 12 and a
legal record of any statement made by the extradited person in respect of the offence
concerned. Consent shall be given when the offence for which it is requested is itself
subject to extradition in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;
(b) When that person, having had an opportunity to leave the territory of the
Party to which he has been surrendered, has not done so within 45 days of his final
discharge, or has returned to that territory after leaving it.
2. The requested Party may, however, take any measures necessary to remove the
person from its territory, or any measures necessary under its law, including proceed-
ings by default, to prevent any legal effects of lapse of time.
3. When the description of the offence charged is altered in the course of proceed-
ings, the extradited person shall only be proceeded against or sentenced in so far as
the offence under its new description is shown by its constituent elements to be an
offence which would allow extradition.
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 14, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
46. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 354.
47. Id. at 356-57.
48. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
49. M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 22, at 356.
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was surrendered. 50
B. Denial of Extradition: The Political Offense Exception
Even if a requesting state meets all of the substantive require-
ments for extradition, the requested state may still deny the request if
the bilateral treaty provides any applicable exceptions.5' The political
offense exception provided by most international extradition treaties
52
prohibits extradition for political crimes. 53 The standard political of-
fense exception, exemplified in the extradition treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom, states:
Extradition shall not be granted if: (i) the offense for which extra-
dition is requested is regarded by the requested party as one of a
political character or (ii) the person sought proves that the request
for his extradition has in fact been made with a view to try to pun-
ish him for an offense of a political character. 54
The political offense exception originated during the Enlighten-
ment Era with the French idea of justified political resistance. 55 In
England, political philosophers, such as John Locke and John Stuart
Mill, expanded upon this right of political resistance.5 6 In the late
nineteenth century, this idea spread to the United States and was re-
flected in the political offense exception of the standard treaty
clause.
5 7
The rationale of the political offense exception is premised on
three interests: those of the requested person, the states concerned (re-
questing and requested state), and international public order.58 The
main justifications for the political offense exception which reflect the
convergence of these interests are: 1) that a belief that individuals
50. Id.
51. Exceptions to extradition include, but are not limited to, offenses of a political nature,
offenses of a military character or offenses of a fiscal character. See id. at 368.
52. Each of the United States' ninety-six treaties provides for the political offense excep-
tion. See generally Thompson, supra note 3.
53. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 1
(1980).
54. Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States - United Kingdom, art. V (1)(c), 28
U.S.T. 227, 230, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
55. See generally, J. LIVELY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1966).
56. See generally, J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. XIX
(1690); see also J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
57. Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in An-
glo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 63 (1979).
58. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 53, at 2.
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have a right to resort to political activism to foster political change; 59
2) that individuals-particularly unsuccessful rebels-should not be
returned to countries where they may be punished because of their
political opinions;60 3) and that governments-in particular, their
non-political branches-should not intervene in the internal struggles
of other nations. 6
1
These three justifications offered for the political offense excep-
tion reflect a widespread acceptance that political crimes have greater
legitimacy than common crimes. 62 Since most extradition treaties do
not define "political offense," the task has been left primarily to judi-
cial interpretation. 63 Courts have developed two categories, pure and
relative political offenses, 64 for deciding when the political offender is
barred from extradition.65
"Pure political offenses" are political crimes such as treason, se-
dition, and espionage.66 Since these acts are directed at a particular
sovereign and not against civilians, courts usually protect an offender
under the political offense exception. 67 Treason, sedition, espionage,
peaceful dissent, freedom of expression and religion are considered
purely political offenses, if they do not incite violence, because they
lack the essential elements of common crimes. The perpetrator of the
alleged offense merely acts as an instrument or agent of a political
movement and is motivated by ideology that does not cause a private
harm.68
A proposed definition of a pure political offense is as follows:
A purely political offense is one whereby the conduct of the actor
manifests an exercise in freedom of thought, expression and belief
(by words, symbolic acts or writing not inciting to violence), free-
dom of association and religious practice which are in violation of
59. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism The Politics of Extradition, 13
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 622 (1981). See also In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
60. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
61. C. VAN DEN WUINGAERT, supra note 53, at 3.
62. Note, In re Doherty: Distinguishing Terrorist Activities From Politically Motivated Acts
Under the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 1 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 99, 105-06
(1985).
63. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 59.
64. Sofaer, supra note 16, at 126.
65. Thompson, supra note 3, at 317.
66. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 59, at 623.
67. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law,
48 VAL. L. REv. 1226, 1234 (1962).
68. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 382.
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law designed to prohibit such conduct. 69
"Relative political offenses," 70 however, are more problematic
since they encompass both political and criminal elements.7' A rela-
tive political offense occurs when an offender commits a common
crime prompted -by ideological motives. Unlike the rule of the pure
political offense, the parameters of the relative political offense are
difficult to formulate because this classification intermixes political el-
ements with criminal elements. Consequently, the relative political
offense category is where controversy arises as nations must rely on
some type of political offense test. 72 Examples of relative political of-
fenses include murder, bombing and skyjacking. These illustrations
by themselves suggest the difficulty in applying the political offense
exception.
73
III. INTERPRETATION OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE: THE
INCIDENCE TEST
A. Origins of the Incidence Test in British Common Law
Today, the United States' courts generally use a test of British
common law origin to decide if the political offense exception bars
extradition. 74 The English courts first defined the implications of
treaty provisions prohibiting the surrender of political offenders in In
re Castioni.75 "In re Castioni marks the first major attempt by Anglo-
American courts to reconcile the interests of the state, the laws of the
state, and the interests of the fugitive."
'76
Castioni was a Swiss citizen who fled to England after shooting a
government official during a large citizen demonstration. 77 The citi-
zen demonstration resulted from continued dissatisfaction with the
government. The evidence suggested that Castioni never met with the
government official and there were no personal grievances. 78 The case
was an obvious example of a relative political offense79 because it
69. Id. at 383.
70. Sofaer, supra note 16, at 126
71. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 59, at 624.
72. Sofaer, supra note 16, at 126.
73. Note, Distinguishing Terrorist Activities, supra note 62, at 109.
74. Epps, supra note 57, at 68.
75. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
76. Epps, supra note 57, at 64.
77. Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149.
78. Id. at 151.
79. I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 170.
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arose during a demonstration against the government and it provided
an opportunity for the court to define the nature of an "offense of a
political character. 8
0
The British court stated the test for a political offense exception
as: "Whether, upon the facts, it is clear that a man was acting as one
of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political char-
acter with a political object, and as part of the political movement and
an [up]rising exists in which he was taking part.""'
Thus, from Castioni, courts developed the traditional two-prong
"incidence test" to define the nature of a political offense barring ex-
tradition. First, offenses must be "common crimes committed in the
course"8 2 of an uprising, and second, they must be "in the furtherance
of political disturbance" 83 to be considered political. While the inci-
dence test is used today in the United States,84 the British courts no
longer follow the test set out in Castioni.8 5 Rather, the British courts
today have relaxed the requirement that a political offense be commit-
ted in furtherance of a political uprising, as exemplified in Ex parte
Kolczynski.8
6
In Kolczynski, seven Polish sailors, under restraint, brought their
ship into an English port for the purpose of seeking political asylum.
87
Poland sought their extradition from England based on nonpolitical
crimes such as assault on the high seas and revolt on board a ship
against the authority of the master.88
The accused seamen, however, exhibited evidence that suggested
they would be tried for treason if they returned to Poland. 89 Britain
denied extradition because Poland intended to try the accused for
treason rather than for the common crimes upon which it had based
its request.90
Kolczynski illustrates that today British courts may look into the
80. Id.
81. Castioni, 1 Q.B. at 159.
82. Id. at 171.
83. Id. '
84. Thompson, supra note 3, at 322.
85. Id.
86. Ex parte Kolczynski, (1955] 1 Q.B. 540. In this case, Great Britain broadened its
inquiry to evaluate the connection between the political objective and the alleged crime. See
Garcia-Mora, supra note 67, at 1243.
87. Kolczynski, 1 Q.B. 540.
88. Id. at 541-42.
89. Id. at 541.
90. Id. at 552-53.
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motives of the governments requesting extradition in order to deter-
mine if a political offense has realistically been committed in further-
ance of a political uprising.9'
B. The Incidence Test in United States Law
The United States' concept of a political offense is reflected in
Castioni. The United States case establishing the traditional incidence
test set forth in Castioni was In re Ezeta.92 In re Ezeta involved the
Republic of Salvador requesting extradition from the United States of
its former President, Ezeta, on murder and robbery charges. The
charges stemmed from Ezeta's actions taken with his officers in an
attempt to suppress a revolutionary coup. The murder charges
against Ezeta involved his execution order for four people who re-
fused to defend the Republic against the revolutionary coup. 9 3 The
robbery charges involved money Ezeta had taken to pay his troops.
94
President Ezeta took refuge on a United States ship while fleeing from
revolutionary forces against the government of Salvador.
Applying the incidence test established three years previously by
the British courts, the court found the offenses to be political:
The testimony shows that the charges were all committed during
the progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces,
wherein General Ezeta and his companions were seeking to main-
tain the authority of the then existing government against the ac-
tive operation of a revolutionary uprising. With the merits of this
strife I have nothing to do.95
Therefore, both prongs of the Castioni incidence test were met in
Ezeta. The uprising component was established by the revolutionary
coup against the Republic of Salvador. 96 The "incidental to" compo-
nent was established by Ezeta's acts of murder and robbery which
were "incidental" to the revolutionary uprising. 97
Two years after Ezeta, the Supreme Court decided its only polit-
ical offense case. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, 98 Mexico sought the return of
three nationals on murder charges. While crossing from Texas to
91. Id.
92. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
93. Id. at 975-76.
94. Id. at 976.
95. Id. at 997.
96. Id. at 1002.
97. 62 F. 972, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
98. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
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Mexico, Ruiz and his comrades attacked Mexican soldiers, assaulted
the villagers and stole from the local village. The group claimed that
their alleged crimes were within the treaty of extradition between the
United States and Mexico. 99 The Supreme Court found that Ruiz and
his colleagues had not committed political offenses because the band's
rampage did not rise to the level of a political uprising, and therefore
were extraditable. 100
However, the Court's conclusion in favor of extradition was
based less on -a stringent application of the political offense exception
than on procedural mechanisms. 10 1 For instance, apparently the
Supreme Court opted for the extradition of Ruiz due to political con-
siderations. Secretary of State Greshaw had already expressed his
view to the Mexican Foreign Minister that the offenses were not
political:
The idea that these acts were perpetrated with bona fide political or
revolutionary designs is negatived by the fact that immediately af-
ter this occurrence, though no superior armed force of the Mexican
government was in the vicinity to hinder their advance into the
country, the bandits withdrew with their booty across the river
into Texas.
0 2
Therefore, although Ruiz qualified under the political offense excep-
tion, he was still extradited because the Court did not want to embar-
rass the executive branch. Friendly relations with Mexico were more
important at that juncture than giving refuge to a few quasi-revolu-
tionaries. Restricting the scope of habeas corpus provided a proce-
dural mechanism for a political end.10 3
Recent political offense cases in international extradition law
have also applied the traditional Castioni incidence test with few devi-
ations.' °4 In In re McMullen, °5 the United Kingdom sought the ex-
tradition from the United States of a former Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) member accused of murder in connection
with the bombing of a military barracks in England. The PIRA is a
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id. at 511-12.
101. Epps, supra note 57, at 70.
102. 161 U.S. at 511.
103. Epps, supra note 57, at 70.
104. Deviations from the incidence test to detect the political offense exception will be
discussed later; see infra text and accompanying notes 104-19. See, e.g., Karadzole v. Ar-
tukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
105. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
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militant offshoot of the Irish Republican Army dedicated to using ter-
rorism to remove the British from Northern Ireland.'0 In that case,
the United States magistrate concluded that McMullen's acts had
taken place during an uprising throughout the United Kingdom and
were incidental to the political disturbance. Therefore, the political
offense exception applied and extradition was denied.107
Similarly, the magistrate in In re Mackin,108 also applied the
traditional incidence test. In that case, the United Kingdom sought
the extradition of an Irish Republican Army member accused of mur-
dering a British soldier in Northern Ireland. As in In re McMullen,
extradition was denied because both the uprising and incidental to
requirements in the political offense exception were satisfied. The
conflict in Northern Ireland was characterized as a political contest
concerning the control of the state and the offense of murder was held
to be incidental to the contest.1 9
In contrast to the generally consistent application of the tradi-
tional incidence test,110 the Seventh Circuit' in Eain v. Wilkes,1 I' ap-
plied a different test with limitations on the political offense exception
that had not previously been a part of United States law. First, the
Eain court distinguished between conflicts that involved "on-going,
organized battles between contending armies," and conflicts that in-
volved groups with "the dispersed nature of the PLO [Palestine Liber-
ation Organization]." ' 12 The court noted that only in the former
situation could a clear distinction be drawn between the activities of
the military forces and individual acts of violence. Second, the court
required that there be a "direct link between the perpetrator, a polit-
ical organization's political goals, and the specific act.", 13 In order to
apply such a direct link test, a court must examine the motivation for
the political legitimacy of the act. Third, the Court simply stated
that, regardless of the political objective, "the indiscriminate bombing
106. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1981).
107. Later, the United States government tried to deport McMullen because of his illegal
entry into the United States and his undocumented status. The Ninth Circuit denied deporta-
tion since McMullen established that because he had deserted the PIRA, his life or freedom
would be threatened if he returned to the United Kingdom. Id.
108. No. 80Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1981).
109. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1314.
110. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
111. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 519.
113. Id. at 521.
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of a civilian population is not recognized as a protective political
act."1 14
In Eain v. Wilkes, Israel requested the extradition of an alleged
member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) charged
with exploding a bomb in the marketplace of an Israeli city."1s Ap-
plying its deviated test, the court stated that a random bombing, in-
tended to indiscriminately bomb a civilian population, is not
recognized as a protected political act.1 16 Therefore, based on a devia-
tion from the traditional incidence test, the Seventh Circuit in Eain
affirmed the granting of Israel's extradition request. 117
In the most recent Ninth Circuit political offense case, the court
in Quinn v. Robinson 118 affirmed using the traditional incidence test to
detect a political offense. Based on the traditional incidence test with
the uprising and "incidental to" requirements, the Ninth Circuit de-
nied Quinn's political offense plea to bar his extradition to the United
Kingdom. 119
IV. CRITICISM OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION AND/OR
THE INCIDENCE TEST AS ENCOURAGING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
A. Criticism of the Political Offense Exception
Critics of the political offense exception and/or the incidence
test, when used to detect a political offense, claim one or both encour-
ages international terrorism. 120 The extremists believe that the polit-
ical offense exception should be abolished' 2 1 because it encourages
international terrorism by allowing those committing violence in
other countries to seek asylum in the United States. 22 Other critics
state that, while the political offense exception should be kept, it
should be reformed with some new standard because the traditional
incidence test does not adequately separate political offenders from
114. Id.
115. Id. at 507.
116. Id. at 521.
117. Id. at 523. The Eain case will be more fully discussed later in this Comment. See
infra text accompanying notes 209-25.
118. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
119. The Quinn case will be fully discussed later in this Comment. See infra pages 25-28.
120. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also In re McMullen,
No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings
on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 294-96 (1981).
121. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
122. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 53, at 150.
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international terrorists. 123 These critics argue that the present opera-
tion of the exception poses difficult definitional problems due to the
test's vagueness; international terrorists are treated the same as those
who act on the basis of conscience.
1. Abolition of the Political Offense
In the United States, various scholars advocate abolishing the
political offense exception in extradition law to reduce incidents of
terrorism.1 24 Such commentators suggest proposals to replace the
political offense exception. One scholar, Epps,125 advocates the aboli-
tion of the political offense exception as it "needlessly hamper[s] har-
monious and pragmatic international relations."' 126 Epps suggests a
solution where two states would rely on existing executive discretion
in granting asylum to protect acts of conscience.' 27 Such a solution,
she claims, preserves the right not to extradite those who are being
sought merely for their acts of conscience while reducing acts of ter-
rorism which hamper fruitful international relations. 128
A second proposal by Bassiouni' 29 would remove the political
offense from the domestic decision making process of the states in-
volved by giving an international court exclusive jurisdiction over the
exception.130 The proponent claims this proposal would reduce polit-
ical tension.131 Political tension would be reduced because the excep-
tion would no longer be domestically administered which, she claims,
is the problem with the political offense exception.
132
2. Reform of the Traditional Incidence Test
While some propose to abolish the political offense exception,
many scholars advocate reforming the traditional incidence test now
used to detect a political offense to reduce the incidents of terrorists
123. See infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text for suggestions for a new standard
other than the incidence test.
124. Epps, supra note 57, at 87.
125. Epps, supra note 57.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22.
130. Id. at 257-58.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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employing the exception to escape extradition.1 33 A popular new ap-
proach suggested by many commentators calls for the advocation of
judicial treatment. 1 34 One example of judicial treatment is following a
balancing approach to be used by the judiciary.1 35 Such an approach
would weigh the political motives of an act against the gravity of the
crimes and the manner of the execution.
A second alternative to the traditional incidence test is to have
the Department of State conduct an extradition hearing modeled after
the Administrative Procedure Act.1 3 6 By conducting an extradition
hearing administratively rather than judicially, more uniform results
would follow since one board would conduct all the hearings.
A third proposal in lieu of the incidence test is to codify in either
a statute or treaty the matter of political discretion. This codification
would define acts of terrorism which would constitute grounds for
extradition and which terrorist tactics are to be tolerated.1 37 If codi-
fied, the judiciary would not have to inquire into the inherently polit-
ical nature of the offense, thereby eliminating the need to decide the
political legitimacy of an act as was done in Eain.138 Furthermore, by
codifying a definition of terrorist tactics, the mechanically applied
Castioni test would not thwart judicial attempts to recognize the cru-
cial role of terrorist tactics in some political movements. 39
B. Why Critics Associate the Political Offense Exception with
International Terrorism
Critics who advocate abolishing or narrowing the political of-
133. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty of
defining international terrorism.
134. See Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders"; The Political Offense Excep-
tion in the United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 168, 219 (1984); Hannay, Interna-
tional Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 381 (1979); Lubet & Czakes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of
Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 267-69 (1980); Sternberg & Skelding,
State Department Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 170 (1983).
135. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 134; Hannay, supra note 134; Lubet & Czakes, supra
note 134; Sternberg & Skelding, supra note 134; Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political
Offense Exception: An Administrative Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163 (1980); Note, American
Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 57; Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political
Asylum, 88 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1985); Epps, supra note 52; M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 22.
136. Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Exception, supra note 125, at
179.
137. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 59, at 643.
138. Hannay, supra note 134, at 405.
139. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism, supra note 59, at 643.
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fense exception ' 40 do so because they associate the exception with in-
ternational terrorism.'4' The critics assume that a relationship exists
between the political offense exception and terrorism because they be-
lieve "that modern revolutionary tactics, which include violence di-
rected at civilians, are not politically legitimate."' 142 This inherent
conceptual shortcoming skews any political offense analysis because,
in deciding what tactics are acceptable, the commentators impose on
other nations and cultures their own traditional notions of how inter-
nal political struggles should be conducted.'
43
Many tactics used by individuals or groups seeking to change
their domestic governments are not acceptable to United States citi-
zens. For example, many or most United States citizens find distaste-
ful indiscriminate bombings in public places'" to achieve political
change. However, these tactics are employed by persons who do not
share the cultural and social values or mores of many United States
citizens.' 45 Moreover, in contrast to more organized and identifiable
past revolutions such as the American Revolution, today's revolutions
are often carried out by many different ideological groups whose only
common tie is to oppose those in power (such as the Contras). How-
ever, United States citizens should not attempt to impose their sense
of political reality on others. Critics should separate their cultural
and emotional biases when distinguishing between "terrorism" 46 and
internal political struggles because "it is not our place to impose our
notions of civilized strife on people who are seeking to overthrow re-
gimes in control of their countries in contexts and circumstances that
we have not experienced and which we can identify only with the
greatest difficulty.' 47
Instead, critics should focus on the fact that revolutionaries are
attempting to change their governments. This goal makes the polit-
ical offense exception applicable because of the insurgent's motives for
140. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
141. Id.
142. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
143. Id.
144. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 521 (7th Cir. 1981).
145. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804.
146. The definition of international terrorism is problematic. The United States Code does
not contain any criminal statute defining international terrorism per se. See Kornblum &
Jachnycky, Politics, The Courts and Terrorism Are the Laws Adequate?, 26 JuDGEs J. 16-21
(1987).
147. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804.
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desiring the change. Indeed, the whole basis for the evolution of the
political offense exception was the very separation between common
crimes and political offenses.' 48 As opposed to common offenses,
political crimes are not inherently criminal because the perpetrator
acts not for personal motives but for the benefit of society as a
whole.' 49 Criminal acts, in contrast, are anti-social and not commit-
ted to improving the general well-being of society. 50 Because the
political offender is committed to enhancing the general well-being of
his society, his acts are less reprehensible and in some cases, even ex-
cusable.I5  Therefore, the judiciary's role is not to determine tacitly
that particular political objectives are not legitimate.
52
Because of the inherent distinction between common crimes and
political offenses, 53 both the policy and legal considerations differ
dramatically between acts of international terrorism and violent acts
committed as part of other nations' internal political struggles. How-
ever, while the application of the political offense exception comports
with both the original justifications for the exception and the require-
ments of the traditional incidence test, its application to acts of inter-
nal terrorism comport with neither.
154
V. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION IS A WORKABLE
REALITY AS IT PROMOTES THE GOALS THAT
ORIGINALLY INSPIRED ITS INCEPTION AND AS
IT ENSURES THAT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS ARE SUBJECT TO EXTRADITION
A. The Incidence Test Protects Acts of Domestic Violence in
Connection with a Struggle for Political Self-Determination
As stated in Quinn v. Robinson:
[t]here is no need to create a new mechanism for defining 'political
offenses' in order to ensure that . . . international terrorists will be
subject to extradition, and that the exception will continue to cover
the type of domestic revolutionary conduct that inspired its opera-
tion in the first place. The traditional incidence test requires no
148. Note, Distinguishing Terrorist Activities, supra note 62, at 105.
149. Id. at 105-06.
150. For example, in Fain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981), a bomb was placed
in an open marketplace in the name of political opposition.
151. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 53, at 3.
152. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. Note, Distinguishing Terrorist Activities, supra note 62, at 105-06.
154. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805.
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modification as while it protects acts of domestic violence in con-
nection with a struggle for political self-determination, it was not
intended to and does not protect acts of international terrorists.
1 55
1. The Incidence Test Serves to Limit the Political Offense
Exception to its Historic Purposes
Both the "uprising" and "incidental to" requirements of the
traditional incidence test serve to limit the political offense exception
to its historical purposes. 56 In general, the historical purpose of the
political offense exception is to protect an individual's right to agitate
for political change, even if through violent means. 5 7 In order to ex-
plain this policy, both components of the incidence test will be ex-
amined in light of the connection between domestic violence and
political self-determination.
i. The "Uprising" Component
The first element of the political offense exception is that the act
must have occurred during an uprising, rebellion, or revolution. Fur-
ther, the accused must be a member of the group participating in the
uprising. 158 Therefore, the uprising requirement limits the exception
in two respects. First, the exception is limited to situations where a
certain level of violence exists.' 5 9 In addition, such acts must be used
by revolutionaries to bring about a change in the composition or
structure of the government in their country.16° Second, " 'an upris-
ing' cannot extend beyond the [physical] borders of the country or
territory in which a group of citizens or residents is seeking to change
their particular government or governmental structure."' 6' For ex-
ample, if a Turk bombed the Turkish Embassy in Britain and then
fled to the United States, the uprising requirement would not be met
because the defendant was outside the physical borders of Turkey.
Thus, both limitations on the "uprising" requirement seek "to protect
those engaged in internal or domestic struggles over the form or com-
155. Id. at 806.
156. Note, Distinguishing Terrorist Activities, supra note 62, at 105-06.
157. Comment, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A 19th Century British
Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1025 (1984); see
also supra text accompanying notes 55-61 for a full discussion of the historical purposes behind
the political offense exception.
158. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
159. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir. 1986).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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position of their own government, including, of course, struggles to
displace an occupying power." 162 In contrast, when the Irish Repub-
lican Army committed certain acts within Ireland to protest English
presence, the uprising requirement was met as there was a current
uprising in Ireland and such acts occurred within the physical borders
of Ireland.1
63
ii. The "Incident to" Component
The second element of the political offense exception is that the
accused must be a person engaged in acts of political violence with a
political end.' 64 In describing this requirement, the United States
courts have used the phrases "incidental to," "in the course of," "con-
nected to," and "in furtherance of" interchangeably.165 Such terms
are not distinguishable but the term "incidental to" should be used in
order to avoid confusion. If courts are precise in their terminology,
confusion will be lessened, and consistent results will follow. There
are several limitations placed on the "incidental to" requirement.
First, "incidental to" acts are limited by the geographic confines of
the uprising.166 Secondly, there must be a certain level of connection
between the political violence and the political end. 16 However, the
level of connection that is required by the courts is not concrete. The
"act must be causally or ideologically related to the uprising."' 68 For
example, in Ornelas v. Ruiz, 1 6 9 the court suggested that by allowing
extradition, the rapid withdrawal of the bandits after a foray, in the
absence of threatening armed forces, were not acts incidental to an
uprising. 1
70
Basically, the courts use a "liberal nexus test"' 71 to discern if the
"incidental to" requirement has been met."12 Under the liberal nexus
test, the court simply determines whether the conduct of the accused
is related to or connected with the insurgent activity. "7 For example,
162. Id.
163. Id. at 813.
164. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
165. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809.
166. Id. at 806.
167. Id. at 809.
168. Id.
169. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 511 (1896).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 511.
172. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 809 (9th Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 810.
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in Eain, the defendant would not be required to provide evidence that
his act of dropping the bomb in the open marketplace was committed
for political motivations as such evidence is usually not available. In-
stead, the focus would be on whether evidence existed to establish
that the act was committed for purely personal reasons such as ven-
geance or vindictiveness. 174 Therefore, like the "uprising" require-
ment, the "incidental to" requirement is designed to protect those
engaged in domestic struggles for control of their government and not
to protect mercenaries or those acting for non-political motives.
75
2. The Incidence Test Does Not Promote Terrorist Activities
Understandably, because of the limitations placed on both re-
quirements in the incidence test, the historical purposes of the excep-
tion are promoted while international terrorism is not. To illustrate
this point, the current and common terrorist activity of skyjacking is
presented. 176
First, skyjacking would fail the "uprising" requirement of the in-
cidence test for two reasons. Spatially, the act of skyjacking does not
qualify as a political act performed to bring about a change in govern-
ment. 1 77 Skyjacking also fails temporally under the uprising require-
ment because an uprising is geographically limited to the physical
borders of the country or territory in which the uprising is taking
place and skyjackings usually occur elsewhere. 78
Therefore, under the incidence test, the act of skyjacking would
not even reach the "incidental to" requirement as it fails under the
"uprising" requirement. However, even assuming an act of skyjack-
ing could pass muster under the uprising component, the accused
would have a difficult time trying to relate or connect his conduct
with the insurgent activity under the liberal nexus test. Thus, courts
would rarely find that an act of skyjacking was not committed for
purely personal reasons as opposed to political reasons.
174. Id. at 809.
175. Id. at 809-10.
176. Aircraft hijacking is made an extraditable offense in treaties by the United States with
Brazil, New Zealand, and Sweden. The United States agreed in 1969 with Great Britain and
France to add aircraft hijacking to the list of extraditable offenses. DEP'T ST. BULL., (Dec. 22,
1969), at 592; see also Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695,
707-10 (1969).
177. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir. 1986).
178. Id.
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B. Quinn v. Robinson: A Proper Application Of The Incidence
Test, Does Not Encourage International Terrorism
Quinn v. Robinson 179 is important in considering the political of-
fense exception as it is the most recent case which applies the proper
test to find a political offense. In Quinn v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit
embraced and defended the application of the traditional incidence
test. The court illustrated the proper considerations of the incidence
test which, when applied correctly, do not allow the United States to
become a haven for international terrorists.
18 0
In Quinn v. Robinson, United Kingdom officials sought the extra-
dition of William Joseph Quinn, an alleged PIRA member, 181 on
charges of murder and conspiracy to cause bomb explosions. Alleg-
edly, Quinn had been involved in a conspiracy with PIRA members
who planned a number of bombing incidents.182 Quinn's murder
charges centered around the incident of shooting and killing an off-
duty, out-of-uniform police constable.
83
While being held by the Northern Ireland government in May,
1975, a witness identified Quinn as the murderer of the constable. 8 4
179. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
180. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
181. The Provisional Irish Republican Army is a militant branch of the Irish Republican
Army dedicated to using terrorist methods to achieve the removal of the British from North-
ern Ireland. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1981).
182. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986). The evidence before the United
States centered around six specific bombing incidents:
1. On January 18, 1974, a hollowed-out copy of the Bible containing a bomb was mailed
to Roman Catholic Bishop Tickel. Quinn's fingerprints were on the wrapping paper around
the bomb.
2. On January 30, 1974, a letter bomb was sent to and exploded on Crown Court Judge
John Huxley Buzzard. Quinn's fingerprints were again found on the wrapping around the
bomb.
3. On February 4, 1974, a letter bomb was sent to the chairman of the Daily Express
newspaper, Max Aitken, and subsequently exploded in the face of a security guard. Quinn's
fingerprints were found on the paper wrappings of the book concealing the bomb.
4. On December 20, 1974, a bomb was found at a railway station in Hampshire County,
England. Quinn's co-conspirator's fingerprints were found on the wrapping paper of the
bomb.
5. On December 21, 1974, a bomb was found in the archway entrance to the Kings
Arms Public House in Warminister, England.
6. On January 27, 1975, a bomb was found on the front step of the Charco-Burger Grill
on Heath Street in London. Quinn's fingerprints were again found on the wrappings of the
bomb. See id. at 783-84.
183. Police Constable Stephen Tibble noticed the chase of a man by two other police of-
ficers and so, blocked the suspect's path. The suspect shot Tibble three times and ran, evading
the other officers. Tibble died that afternoon. Id. at 784.
184. Id. at 785.
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Quinn, a United States citizen, had returned to the United States
where officials arrested him pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant
on behalf of the United Kingdom. 185
At the magistrate's hearing, Quinn asserted the political offense
exception to block his extradition to the United Kingdom. The mag-
istrate stated the incidence test of the political offense exception en-
tails three prongs: 1) whether there was a war, rebellion, revolution or
political uprising at the time and place of the offenses; 2) whether
Quinn was a member of the uprising group; and 3) whether the of-
fenses for which extradition is sought were incidental to and in fur-
therance of the political uprising. 186 The magistrate concluded that
the political offense exception did not bar Quinn's extradition to the
United Kingdom because Quinn had not proven he was a member of
the PIRA187 or that his were incidental to a political uprising.
188
The district court reversed the magistrate's decision, stating that
the political offense exception barred Quinn's extradition to the
United Kingdom. 8 9 The district court rejected the magistrate's ver-
sion of the incidence test by eliminating the membership requirement,
which required that the defendant be a member of the uprising
group. 190 The court held that there was an uprising in Northern Ire-
land at the time of the offenses with which Quinn was charged. 19'
This uprising consisted of PIRA members seeking to change the
structure of the government in the country in which they lived.
Moreover, criminal activity in Northern Ireland in conjunction with
this uprising clearly satisfied the "incidental to" requirement in the
incidence test.' 92
The Ninth Circuit, correctly applying the traditional incidence
test, reversed the district court's ruling and thus allowed Quinn's ex-
tradition. 93 First, to clear any confusion about the misapplication of
the incidence test, the court stated the requirements for the political
185. Id. at 783.
186. Id. at 810-11.
187. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 811 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court in Quinn
rejected the membership requirement as adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1981).
188. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 811.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 811 (9th Cir. 1981).
193. Id. at 818.
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offense exception. 94 The court clearly stated that the incidence test
has two components: the 'uprising' requirement and the 'incidental
to' requirement.195 The 'uprising' component requires that there be
an uprising, rebellion, or revolution. 196 The 'incidental to' component
requires that an offense must occur in the context of an uprising. 197
The court further extrapolated on the proper considerations in both
the "uprising" and "incidental to" prongs, rejecting the membership
requirement. 198
The Ninth Circuit disagreed primarily with the district court's
holding that a political uprising in Northern Ireland extended to Eng-
land.19 9 Although an uprising existed in Northern Ireland at the time
the charged offenses were committed, there was no uprising in Eng-
land.200 In other words "the level of violence outside Northern Ire-
land was insufficient in itself to constitute an uprising. ' 201 As the
magistrate found, what violence there was was not being generated by
citizens or residents of England. 202
The court further noted that the "uprising" requirement was not
met because Quinn's offenses took place in England, a different geo-
graphical location than where the PIRA was seeking to change the
form of their government-Northern Ireland.20 3 Instead, an "upris-
ing" refers to a people rising up in their own land against the govern-
ment of that land.204 The "uprising" requirement does not tolerate
terrorism exported to other locations as in the instant case.20 5 If the
acts had occurred in Northern Ireland, the Ninth Circuit probably
would have taken another view of the case, respecting the 'uprising'
requirement. Moreover, violent acts cannot be committed by persons
not residing in the area in which the violent act occured, such as
Quinn, a United States citizen.2°6
Therefore, since the Ninth Circuit concluded that the uprising
194. Id. at 806-09.
195. Id. at 806.
196. Id.
197. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806 (9th Cir. 1981).
198. Id. at 806-09.
199. Id. at 813.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 813 (9th Cir. 1981).
203. Id.
204. id.
205. Id. at 813-14.
206. Id. at 814.
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requirement was not met in the incidence test, neither the bombing
nor murder charges were non-extraditable offenses under the political
offense exception to the extradition treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Quinn v. Robinson does not condone inter-
national terrorism but instead illustrates that a proper application of
the incidence test in detecting the political offense exception is a viable
approach.
C. Political Offense Problems Only Arise Upon Deviation from the
Traditional Incidence Test or its Misapplication
Problems and criticisms of the political offense exception tend to
arise when courts deviate from the United States law embodied in the
incidence test. In the recent political offense cases that have applied
the traditional United States incidence test,20 7 the abuses noted by
commentators have been avoided.
208
A flagrant example of a deviation from the traditional incidence
test is found in Eain v. Wilkes. 20 9 The Eain court "superimposed a
number of limitations on the political offense exception that had not
previously been a part of the United States law."' 210
In Eain, Israel requested the extradition of an alleged member of
the Palestine Liberation Organization accused of exploding a bomb in
the marketplace of an Israeli city.211  The defendant challenged his
extradition under the political offense exception to the United States-
Israel Treaty,212 based on the P.L.O. claim of responsibility for the
bombing. A magistrate granted Israel's extradition request; the dis-
207. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979) (The United King-
dom sought the extradition of a former Provisional Irish Republican Army member from the
United States on murder charges. The United States denied extradition on the basis of the
political offense exception); in re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981) appeal
dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (The United Kingdom sought the extradition from the
United States of an Irish Republican Army member accused of murdering a British soldier.
The United States denied extradition on the basis of the political offense exception); Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 179-206 and accompanying text.
208. See generally supra text accompanying notes 120-54.
209. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
210. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
211. Id. at 507.
212. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, art. VI(4), 14 U.S.T.
1707, 1709, T.I.A.S. No. 5476. The Convention provides in relevant part:
Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances: When the
offense is regarded by the requested party as one of a political character or if the
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with
a view to trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character.
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trict court denied habeas corpus relief, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed. 213 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that regardless of the
political objective, "the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace
is not recognized as a protected political act. ' 214
While the result in Eain is not necessarily disturbing, the applica-
tion of the incidence test is problematic. In reaching its decision, the
Eain court deviated from both the "uprising" and "incidental to" re-
quirements in the incidence test. First, the "court redefined an 'upris-
ing' as a struggle between organized, non-dispersed military
forces. '215 The Eain court's definition of the uprising component is
incorrect as it invites ideological and foreign policy determination by
extradition courts.
Unlike their British counterpart, the United States courts
demonstrated a "judicial aloofness" 216 in applying the incidence test
to decide if an offense is political. 217 United States courts, as exempli-
fied in In re Ezeta, should be unconcerned with the nature of the polit-
ical motives or the "complexion of the old or new regime. '218
Second, the Eain court also introduced a new version of the "in-
cidental to" requirement in stating that a direct tie must exist between
the perpetrator, a political organization's political goals, and the spe-
cific act. 219 Therefore, in order to evaluate the "direct link" 220 be-
tween the offense and the conflict, the court must examine the
motivation for and political legitimacy of the act.
221
This specific rendition of the incidence test in Eain is especially
problematic because a court is again invited to impose its own ideo-
logical and foreign policy determinations in examining the motivation
for and political legitimacy of the act.222 Again, such a focus allows
United States citizens to impose their own sense of political reality
onto others, instead of separating their cultural and emotional biases.
Apparently, the Eain court concluded that the P.L.O.'s objectives
were not politically legitimate in determining if the political offense
213. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 523 (7th Cir. 1981).
214. Id. at 521.
215. Id. at 519-20.
216. Epps, supra note 57, at 69.
217. Id. at 68-9.
218. Id.
219. Fain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
220. Id. at 515-16.
221. Id. at 520.
222. Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Exception, supra note 135, at
177-78.
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exception applied to bar extradition.223
The Eain court attempted to rationalize its significant departure
from the traditional incidence test. The court claimed that in the ab-
sence of their newly imposed restrictions:
[N]othing would prevent an influx of terrorists seeking a safe haven
in America .... Terrorists who have committed barbarous acts
elsewhere would be able to flee to the United States, and live in our
neighborhoods and walk our streets forever free from any account-
ability for their acts. We do not need them in our society ... the
political offense exception... should be applied with great care lest
our country become a social jungle .... 224
Such a rationale is inaccurate since, as illustrated in Quinn v. Robin-
son, a proper application of the traditional test prevents potential ter-
rorists from escaping extradition through the political offense
exception. 2
25
Irregardless of the result in Eain, any deviation from a proper
application of the incidence test should be avoided. Deviation and
misapplication create confusion, and inconsistent tests and results.
Thus, the problem is the application of the political offense exception.
The problem does not lie in the political offense exception itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The incidence test has been applied since 1894 and has been a
longstanding tradition in United States extradition law. The inci-
dence test, in light of its historical origins and goals, has served the
United States well, and continues to do so. Critics' concern that this
country not become a haven for international terrorists can readily be
met through a proper application of the incidence test. Acts of inter-
national terrorism do not meet the incidence test and are not thus
covered by the political offense exception.
Rabia Anne Cebeci
223. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
224. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
225. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 806.
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